Privatization in Eastern Europe has helped transition the region's economies from planned to free market. However, the e¤ects of privatization on the environment are relatively unknown and many …rms remain under state ownership today. We compare the environmental performance of state-owned and privatized energy utility plants in Eastern Europe utilizing a novel panel data that includes reported sulfur dioxide emissions, energy input, and ownership status. We …nd that state-owned plants emit more sulfur dioxide than privately owned plants; this is environmentally signi…cant as privatization is associated with a reduction in emissions of about 55 percent.
Introduction
There are various reasons why a country may or may not choose to retain public ownership of energy utilities. 1 Using Poland as an example, the Polish Ministry of Economy listed three objectives for its energy industry in 2000: 1) energy security 2) improvement of competitiveness in energy sector and 3) protection of the environment (Jouret, 2006) . Polish citizens that are used to state-owned energy utilities might view government control of energy as more secure than private control (Nestor and Mahboobi, 2000) . Competitiveness would theoretically improve with privatization (Holder, 2000) . However, it is not conceptually clear what the e¤ect of privatization would be on the environment. We aim to investigate this by comparing environmental performance as measured by sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions for privatized and state-owned energy utilities. SO 2 is a pollutant that has relatively wellunderstood abatement technologies and environmental e¤ects making it a logical choice for examining …rm behavior. We concentrate on the energy utilities industry because many of the largest emitters of SO 2 are energy utilities and various governments have retained signi…cant ownership in this sector. The energy sector makes up approximately 95 percent of Poland's total SO 2 emissions (Poland Ministry of the Environment, 2007).
Beginning in the early 1990's Eastern European governments privatized many …rms that were previously under state control. This provided a source of revenue for government and propelled the transition toward a market economy. While some …rms were privatized, others remained under state control. Presently, governments continue to contemplate selling state-owned …rms in various industries such as telecommunications and electricity genera- 1 By energy utilities we are referring to electricity generating and combined heat and power plants.
tion. Poland is a leading example of the approach that Eastern European governments have pursued. According to Jouret (2006) , Poland has privatized ten out of its twenty-three combined heat and power (CHP) plants. Of its dedicated electricity generation plants, Poland has privatized only four and retains sole ownership of 75 percent of the electricity generation capacity (Jouret, 2006 ). 2 Using a novel plant level data set of Eastern European energy utilities, we investigate From a policy perspective, it is useful to understand how plant ownership can potentially a¤ect SO 2 emissions. SO 2 can cause acid rain, which damages aquatic ecosystems and soil quality, harms forests, and deteriorates buildings and infrastructure. In addition, SO 2
contributes to respiratory problems as a local and regional air pollutant. The European Union regulates SO 2 emissions because of these adverse consequences. Under several pieces of legislation, including the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD), member countries are obligated to monitor and report emissions and conform to the standards developed in the directive. The LCPD requires member states to limit sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter emissions from combustion plants with a rated thermal input of 50
MWth or more, so there will be increasing pressure to reduce emissions from energy utilities.
Furthermore, the EU member countries still owning a large share of their energy utilities plants, such as Poland and Romania, will undoubtedly investigate privatizing more energy utilities in the future. Our results suggest that this privatization could lead to lower SO 2 emissions.
Previous Literature
The literature on privatization has been extensive over the past twenty years. Thus, the relationship between ownership status and regulatory pressure is ambiguous.
Next, we examine the relationship between ownership status and relative concern for environmental protection. State-owned plants might have higher relative concerns for environmental protection because they are seeking to please government o¢ cials or the public.
Conversely, privatized plants might have higher relative concerns for environmental protection because of public image concerns in the country of production and potentially in foreign markets.
(Hypothesis 4a): Suppose privatized plants have higher relative concern for environmental protection. This will lead the privatized plant to internalize more of the damages from emissions to society and M C s (z) < M C p (z): Then, z s > z p and we observe higher emissions from state-owned plants.
(Hypothesis 4b): Suppose state-owned plants have higher relative concern for environmental protection. This will lead the state-owned plants to internalize more of the damages from emissions to society and M C s (z) > M C p (z): Then, z s < z p and we observe lower emissions from state-owned plants.
Again, ownership status has a conceptually ambiguous e¤ect.
Within this simple conceptual framework, we have three possible explanations for why state-owned plants would have higher emissions and three possible explanations why privatized plants would have higher emissions. Hence, it is not clear which ownership status should be conceptually associated with higher emissions. We therefore empirically investigate the relationship.
Data and EU Regulatory Background
Prior to describing our data, we explain the EU regulatory context during our study period 
LCPD
With the goal of improving human and environmental health, the EU adopted the LCPD in emissions. Thus, we brie ‡y overview the ETS. internet search to …nd a reliable source detailing ownership information. We …nd either a date of privatization or information that the plant was still state-owned at the end of our study period. Reliable sources include published news articles, governmental and non-governmental research studies, and o¢ cial websites of the energy utilities. 4 Plants that were built privately and never state-owned are removed from the sample. Subsequently, we are left with a sample of 320 energy utility plants on which to base our analysis. As shown in Table 4 , nearly half of the sample's plant-year observations come from Romania. One-quarter of our sample comes from Poland. Hungary and Bulgaria each Note: There are 1920 plant-year observations.
EU ETS
As previously mentioned, the LCPD limits emissions from combustion plants of 50 MWth or larger. The initial date of compliance for the LCPD was January 1, 2008. Plants would not choose to reduce emissions before they are so required, unless it leads to higher pro…ts by doing so. Therefore, we do not anticipate that many …rms would have undertaken the capital investment necessary to reduce emissions prior to the compliance date solely for LCPD compliance. However, countries were required to begin reporting emissions information beginning in 2004 so it is plausible that some forward looking plants did choose to abate some emissions at that time. Also, we expect that plants might behave di¤erently with regards to pollution once they have made the decision to opt out of the LCPD. For these reasons, we do include an indicator variable in our analysis to control for any possible di¤erence in the opted out plants (Opt Out). Table 5 shows the summary statistics for all variables. 
Empirical Methodology
In the conceptual framework, we identify three reasons why state-owned plants might have higher emissions than privatized plants and three reasons why privatized plants might have higher emissions than state-owned plants. We aim to empirically investigate the link between ownership status and environmental performance. We measure environmental performance SO 2 emissions has a highly positively skewed distribution, so we utilize a log transformation for our dependent variable. We also log the non-indicator independent variables to provide an elasticity interpretation on these coe¢ cients. Thus, we specify the following regression equations to examine the association between private versus state ownership and
and
where
if plant i is a privatized plant at time t and 0 if plant i is a state owned plant at time t:
Energy input and thermal rating (mwth) are highly collinear since plants with a larger thermal capacity will logically burn more fuel. In fact, the correlation is 0.93. Since emissions should theoretically depend on the actual amount of fuel burned rather than the capacity of the plant, we utilize energy input as our control. We control for LCPD opt out status and di¤erences between CHP and power plants. Finally, we control for di¤erences across countries with a set of country dummies (CD it ). Unobservable plant-speci…c e¤ects are represented by i : If there is 0 correlation between the i and the explanatory variables, then both OLS and random e¤ects are consistent estimators. If, however, the explanatory variables and the i are correlated, then OLS and random e¤ects are inconsistent estimators and we should estimate using …xed e¤ects. Thus, we would hesitate to utilize random e¤ects or OLS estimation if we think there is some unobserved variable that is correlated with our privatization variable and also raises or lowers emissions. There certainly could be unobserved plant speci…c characteristics related to the privatization process that are correlated with the level of emissions so we prefer to utilize a …xed-e¤ects estimator from a conceptual standpoint. 6 There are two potential sources of endogeneity that could bias results if they are ignored.
First, there may be endogeneity from omitted variables that vary across plants. We may be concerned that there is some unobserved factor that is causing plants to be selected for privatization and is also correlated with SO 2 emissions. In this hypothetical example, the …xed e¤ects model would not adequately control for un-observed heterogeneity since the omitted variable, investment in abatement technology, is changing throughout the panel. To address this potential source of endogeneity, we utilize an instrumental variables approach as a robustness check.
For our instrumental variable we construct a country political variable using the PAR-LINE database on national parliaments. 7 For each country we collect information on the number of elected o¢ cials in the government by political association. We then classify each political party as either pro or anti-privatization. In general, the pro European Union centerright parties are in strong favor of privatization,whereas the center-left governments are in favor of slow privatization with keeping many of the strategic state-owned …rms, such as utilities, in government's control or are completely anti-privatization. We de…ne our political variable as percentage of center-right seats held by o¢ cials in a given county in a given year. If the country has two chambers of government then we …rst calculate the percentage of center-right seats held by o¢ cials in each chamber and then we average the two. This way we obtain percentage of government that is pro privatization for each year in each country.
Elections were usually held every few years and this impacted privatization. Because of the di¤erences in political parties'economic ideology and the direct control the majority party of a government has on privatization, we believe that our IV is a strong predictor of privatization taking place. At the same time political control should have no impact on plant level emissions. As we stated before, the reduction of emissions was driven 7 The data was downloaded in June 2012 from http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp by the European Union and less so by individual governments. In our sample of countries, the pro environment green parties were never in serious contention for government control.
Czech Republic had the highest number of green party government seats with three percent in the Chamber of Deputies during the 2006 election. The higher representation of green candidates in the Czech Republic may be related to why the Czech Republic was the only country in our sample to …le a national reduction plant that was slightly more stringent than the LCPD.
Results
We have a panel of six years on privatization status, energy usage, plant size, and SO 2 emissions. We estimate equations (1) and (2) using the three standard panel estimators of pooled OLS, random e¤ects, and …xed e¤ects. The model test statistics are shown in Tables   7 (estimates for Equation (1)) and 8 (estimates for Equation (2)). The F-test for plantspeci…c e¤ects shows signi…cant individual e¤ects in each of our speci…cations. Thus, we do not report the pooled OLS results since they are not consistent. A Hausman test indicates that random e¤ects results are not consistent in speci…cation (II). Thus, we utilize the …xed e¤ects estimates as our baseline but also present the random e¤ects results in Tables 7 and   8 for comparison. The random e¤ects results can also be informative since we can test for di¤erences in emissions based upon characteristics that do not vary within a …rm throughout the panel, such as opt-out status and type of plant, power or CHP. Note: * signi…cant at 10%, **signi…cant at 5%, *** signi…cant at 1%. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at plant level and are robust. Note: * signi…cant at 10%, **signi…cant at 5%, *** signi…cant at 1%. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at plant level and are robust.
Fixed E¤ects Results
When we estimate a …xed-e¤ects model, we are identifying the e¤ect of privatization from the 37 plants that switch ownership during the study period. The coe¢ cient on our main variable of interest, SvP , is negative and statistically signi…cant in all speci…cations. That is, privatization is associated with decreased emissions both in an absolute sense and on a relative basis. When we do not control for the amount of energy consumed by a plant in speci…cation (I), switching from state to private ownership is associated with a decrease in aggregate SO 2 emissions of around 45 percent. For our preferred speci…cation (II), where we do control for the amount of energy consumed by a plant, privatization is associated with a decrease in SO 2 emissions of around 55 percent. 8 For speci…cation (V I), privatization is associated with a 53 percent reduction in relative emissions. 9 
Random E¤ects Results
When we estimate a random e¤ects model, we are identifying the e¤ect of privatization both from the variation within plants that switch ownership and from the variation across all sample plants. We note that the random e¤ects results are qualitatively similar to the …xed e¤ects results. SvP is statistically signi…cant in all speci…cations with an estimated scale that is similar to the …xed e¤ects regressions for both absolute and relative emissions. Opt out status is not signi…cant so it does not appear that SO 2 emissions are being impacted by plants deciding to opt out of LCPD regulations during the study period. Recall that power plants are over four times larger than CHP's in this sample. Even after controlling for the amount of energy utilized, CHP's emit signi…cantly less SO 2 :
6.3 IV Results Table 9 gives IV results for absolute emissions and Table 10 shows IV results for relative emissions. We note that the sign on SvP is negative and signi…cant for all IV speci…cations.
We …nd that the IV estimates are signi…cantly di¤erent from their non-IV counterparts in speci…cations (IX), (XII), and (XIV ). Here, the IV estimates are preferred since the non-IV estimates are inconsistent. For the other speci…cations, we fail to reject the null that there is no systematic di¤erence between the IV and non-IV estimates. For these speci…cations, we prefer the non-IV estimates because they are consistent and more e¢ cient than the IV estimates. A Wald Test between speci…cations (IX) and (X) con…rms that energy input is an important independent variable. Hence, speci…cation (II) remains our overall preferred speci…cation. 10 
Discussion
Our results are consistent with Hypotheses 2, 3a, and 4a and inconsistent with Hypotheses 1, 3b, and 4b. Since Hypothesis 2 is framed in terms of plants making changes once privatized, we more closely examine the 37 plants that were privatized during our study period to see whether the change in ownership results in changes that are consistent with the hypothesis. Table 11 displays the distribution of these 37 plants across the sample countries and Table 12 10 First stage results for all IV regressions are available upon request. Note: * signi…cant at 10%, **signi…cant at 5%, *** signi…cant at 1%. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered at plant level and are robust. Our novel data set combines ownership information with SO 2 emissions and energy use measures. We capture a substantial majority of the energy utilities plants in Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This is the …rst study that we are aware of that investigates emissions for these countries based upon privatization status.
11
Instead of using energy usage as a proxy for emissions, we utilize actual SO 2 emissions as reported to the EU under the Large Combustion Plant Directive. We can then employ energy usage as an important explanatory variable in our regression analyses. Furthermore, using energy input as a proxy for SO 2 emissions could be misleading since there are several other signi…cant predictors of emissions aside from energy, as we show in our analysis.
